a blog about epistemic virtues, extended & distributed cognition, scientific methodology and social epistemology of science.
Shoots first, asks questions later.
Values in science? Diversity, scientific objectivity and criticism
One of the liveliest discussion topics in the philosophy of science in the last three decades is whether non-epistemic (or non-cognitive) values can have a legitimate role in science –that is, not whether they do intervene but whether they should intervene. It is much less controversial that non-epistemic values influence how scientist choose their topics,…
Trust and criticism in science, Part III: Distribution of epistemic labor, responsibility and credit
It is often pointed out that scientific knowledge is social in character. This statement can mean several quite different things, such as that science is laden with political and moral values, that scientific knowledge is socially constructed, or that it is a public good governed by public interests. More often than not this characterization, usually…
Trust and criticism in science, Part II: Technological extension
In the first part I have talked about where and when trust might play an ineliminable role in science, in contrast to the prevalent opinion that scientific inquiry essentially requires a skeptical attitude. I maintained that the problematic aspect of trust is that it generates epistemic vulnerability, which we clearly should not tolerate in the…
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Duygu Uygun-Tunç 