a blog about epistemic virtues, extended & distributed cognition, scientific methodology and social epistemology of science.
Shoots first, asks questions later.
Trust and criticism in science, Part III: Distribution of epistemic labor, responsibility and credit
It is often pointed out that scientific knowledge is social in character. This statement can mean several quite different things, such as that science is laden with political and moral values, that scientific knowledge is socially constructed, or that it is a public good governed by public interests. More often than not this characterization, usually … Continue reading Trust and criticism in science, Part III: Distribution of epistemic labor, responsibility and credit
In the first part I have talked about where and when trust might play an ineliminable role in science, in contrast to the prevalent opinion that scientific inquiry essentially requires a skeptical attitude. I maintained that the problematic aspect of trust is that it generates epistemic vulnerability, which we clearly should not tolerate in the … Continue reading Trust and criticism in science, Part II: Technological extension
Trust seems to play an ineliminable role in a considerable portion of our ordinary activities of knowledge acquisition. I believe that 382 million people live in the U.S. not because I have conducted a census myself but on the basis of an internet query. Often such trust is rational, because it is adequately justified even … Continue reading Trust and criticism in science, Part I: Critical rationalism instead of organized skepticism